Dematerialization through services is a popular proposal for reducing environmental impact. The idea is that by shifting from the production of goods to the provision of services, a society can reduce its material demands. But do societies with a larger service sector actually dematerialize? I test the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis with a focus on fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions -the primary drivers of climate change. I find no evidence that a service transition leads to carbon dematerialization. Instead, a larger service sector is associated with greater use of fossil fuels and greater carbon emissions per person. This suggests that 'dematerialization through services' is not a valid sustainability policy.
Introduction
'Dematerialization through services' (Heiskanen and Jalas, 2000) is a popular proposal for reducing environmental impact. The idea is that by shifting from producing goods to providing services, a society can reduce its use of materials. But do societies with a larger service sector actually dematerialize? I test the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis with a focus on fossil fuel use and carbon emissions -the primary drivers of climate change. I ask: does a service transition lead to fossil fuel and/or carbon emissions dematerialization?
Using international data from the World Bank, I test for both relative and absolute carbon dematerialization through services. Over the long term, I find that a service transition leads to an increase in the carbon intensity of GDP. Similarly, I find that a service transition leads to increasing carbon emissions per capita. This finding echos Jevons' paradox. Jevons (1906) found that the adoption of more energy efficient technology led to greater (not lesser) energy use (Alcott, 2005; Polimeni et al, 2012) . Like more efficient technology, the service sector can supposedly do more with less. It generates more value added per unit of direct energy input. Yet a service transition produces the opposite of its intended effect. The relative growth of the service sector is associated with greater energy use (and hence greater emissions). The reasons why this occurs are likely complex, but the implications are simple. The evidence indicates that 'dematerialization through services' is not a valid sustainability policy. This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the rationale behind the 'dematerialization through services' proposal. Section 3 outlines methods and Section 4 discusses results. Section 5 discusses reasons why the 'dematerialization through services' proposal fails. Section 6 concludes with thoughts on the significance of this evidence, and what it means for sustainability policy.
Dematerialization Through Services: The Rationale
The 'dematerialization through services' proposal begins with an uncontentious observation. In terms of direct energy use, the service sector is less energy intensive than industrial sectors like mining, manufacturing, and construction. For instance, the US service sector is about 3 to 4 times less energy intensive than US industry (Fig. 1) .
Proponents of the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis take this uncontentious observation, and go one step further. Because of the lower direct resource intensity of the service sector, they propose that a "transition from an industrial to a service society might bring about a decline in the use of materials" (Herman et al, 1990) . A non-exhaustive list of authors who have echoed this proposal would include Cooper (1999) , Hawken (2000) , Herman et al (1990) , Hinterberger and Schmidt-Bleek (1999) , Jackson (1996) , Kahn (1979) , Lovins et al (1999) , OECD (2000) , Panayotou et al (2000) , Romm et al (1999) , Romm (2002) , Stahel (1997) , Victor (2010) , and White et al (1999) . For a good review of the literature on this topic, see Heiskanen and Jalas (2000) and Heiskanen et al (2001) .
While based on plausible reasoning, the 'dematerialization through services' proposal has many critics. Djellal and Gallouj (2016) , Jespersen (1999) , and Lawn (2001) have all argued that it is wrong to treat the service sector as a separate entity from industry. Instead, they argue that services are intrinsically connected to the production of goods (and vice versa). For instance, a car dealership (a service) depends on the production of cars for its existence. Likewise, the car manufacturer depends on the dealership to sell its product. The service sector cannot and does not operate in isolation Hall and Klitgaard, 2012) . One way to capture this interdependence is to measure both direct and indirect energy use. Jesperson (1999) finds that when indirect energy use is included, the Danish private service sector has an energy intensity similar to the manufacturing sector. Kander (2005) identifies a more subtle problem. The growth of the service sector's share of value added is affected by price change. The problem is that service sector prices tend to rise faster than the price of goods. This means that using 'nominal' prices can inflate the growth of the service sector. When 'real' prices are used, there is less evidence for dematerialization through services (Henriques and Kander, 2010) .
Another problem, is that the transition to services could increase transport volumes (Ellger and Scheiner, 1997) . Amazon.com's business model is a good example. Greater transportation volume could nullify any dematerialization that might otherwise occur.
There is also the problem of open borders. Western countries that are deindustrializing are not doing so in isolation. Instead, they are off-shoring many of their industrial processes to developing countries. Davis and Caldeira (2010) find that the US and Western Europe have significant net CO2 emissions embodied in trade. Similarly, Knight and Schor (2014) find that evidence for emissions-GDP decoupling disappears when they account for the emissions embodied in trade. This means we should be skeptical of dematerialization claims that do not account for trade effects (Stern et al, 1996; Day et al, 2014) .
But perhaps the most damning critique of 'dematerialization through services' is that its proponents focus on relative rather than absolute dematerialization. Proponents tout the decreasing energy intensity of GDP. But this is a relative (i.e. intensive) metric that does not indicate the scale of energy use . Our impact on the biosphere depends on the scale of consumption, not the efficiency of this consumption (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) . Giampietro et al. (2012) use the analogy of a mouse and an elephant to illustrate this point. A mouse has a metabolic rate of about 3W/kg, while an elephant has a metabolic rate of about 0.5W/kg. Clearly the elephant is more efficient at using energy. However, the elephant's total energy demand is about 50,000 times that of the mouse. Despite its greater efficiency, the elephant has a far greater impact on its environment. Likewise a wealthy nation may generate more value added per unit of energy than a developing nation. But if the wealthy nation uses more non-renewable energy than the developing nation, its greater 'efficiency' is a moot point for sustainability purposes. Giampietro et al. do not mince words:
That modern neoclassical economists (and quite a few ecological economists) see elephants as dematerialized versions of mice would be a mere amusing finding, if it were not for the fact that this silly narrative is being taught to students in almost every academic programme dealing with the sustainability of human progress ... Similar critiques have been raised by Daly (2013) , Hall and Klitgaard (2012) , and Jackson (2009), among others. I take this critique seriously. Thus, I test for both relative and absolute dematerialization.
Methods
To test for dematerialization through services, I focus on fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions. This gives a direct indicator of climate-change sustainability. I use four different metrics of dematerialization (Tbl. 1). I define relative dematerialization as a decline in the fossil fuel and/or carbon intensity of GDP. I define absolute carbon dematerialization as a reduction in per capita carbon emissions and fossil fuel use (not total emissions and/or fossil fuel use). I use per capita data because I compare countries that have different populations. This removes the effects of population growth, which I regard as a separate sustainability issue from the growth of per capita consumption. Service sector size is measured using both employment share and value-added share (using current prices).
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I test for a scaling relation between each dematerialization metric (D) and the service fraction (S frac ) of employment or value added:
Equation 1 can be rewritten in terms of a log-log regression:
The scaling-exponent α quantifies how the dematerialization metric D behaves 1 Why not measure service sector value added using 'real' prices? First, this data is not available from the World Bank database used here. Second, there are numerous problems with price deflation. The main problem is that relative prices change over time, meaning the choice of base year will affect the resulting deflation (Fix, 2015; Nitzan, 1992; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009 ). Kander (2005) highlights how this affects the calculation of the service sector's share of value added. This same problem also leads to systematic uncertainty in the calculation of real GDP. However, out of convention, I use standard measures of real GDP to test for relative dematerialization. But it is important to recognize that real GDP is not necessarily an objective measure of economic output (Fix, 2019) . as the service sector grows. A negative exponent indicates that the dematerialization metric declines as the service sector increases in size. This is evidence for dematerialization through services. A positive exponent indicates that the dematerialization metric increases as the service sector increases in size. This is evidence against dematerialization through services.
All data for this test comes from the World Bank and covers 217 countries over the years 1991 to 2017 (Tbl. 2). This data is sufficient to conduct a robust test of dematerialization trends between countries. It also allows a more limited test for trends within countries. The short (30 year) time frame limits the ability to establish statistically significant trends within countries.
Figure 2: Testing for Absolute Carbon Dematerialization Through Services
This figure tests for absolute dematerialization through services using between-country evidence. Lines represent the path through time of countries over the years 1991 to 2017. All plots use log-log scales. R 2 values are for log-log regressions on mean values for each country. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction interval of each regression. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C and D keep the same y-axis as Panels A and B (respectively), but measure service sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2).
Figure 3: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services -WithinCountry Evidence
This figure tests for absolute dematerialization through services using within-country evidence. Histograms show the distribution of within-country scaling exponents α (see Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) over the years 1991 to 2017. Vertical lines indicate the mean withincountry exponent. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C and D are similar to panels A and B, but measure service sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2).
Figure 4: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services -BetweenCountry Evidence
This figure tests for relative dematerialization through services using between-country evidence. Lines represent the path through time of countries over the years 1991 to 2017. All plots use log-log scales. R 2 values are for log-log regressions on mean values for each country. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction interval of each regression. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C and D keep the same y-axis as Panels A and B (respectively), but measure service sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2).
Figure 5: Relative Carbon Dematerialization Through Services -WithinCountry Evidence
This figure tests for relative dematerialization through services using within-country evidence. Histograms show the distribution of within-country scaling exponents α (see Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) over the years 1991 to 2017. Vertical lines indicate the mean withincountry exponent. Panel A shows the relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (measured in $2011 purchasing power parity) and service sector employment share. Panel B shows the relation between the CO2 intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panels C and D are similar to panels A and D, but measure service sector size using percentage of total value added. All data comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2). 
Results
Figures 2-5 show the results of my test for carbon dematerialization through services. Figures 2 tests for absolute dematerialization using trends between countries. Figure 3 tests for absolute dematerialization using trends within countries. Figure 4 tests for relative dematerialization using trends between countries. Lastly, Figure 5 tests for relative dematerialization using trends within countries.
Results are summarized in Tables 3-6. I find no evidence that a service transition leads to absolute carbon dematerialization. The between-country trends are clear (Fig. 2 and Tbl. 3). A service transition is systematically associated with the growth of per capita fossil fuel use and carbon emissions. Within-country trends (Fig. 3 and Tbl. 4) are also positive on average, but with a smaller scaling exponent and weaker statistical significance. This weaker evidence is likely due to the short period covered by the within-country data. This allows statistical 'noise' to dominate the 'signal'. Still, the data is sufficient to draw conclusions. There is no evidence for a negative scaling exponent (on average) either between or within countries. Thus, this test does not support absolute dematerialization through services.
The evidence for relative dematerialization through services is less clear. Between-country evidence (Fig. 4 and Tbl. 5) indicates that a service transition is associated with greater fossil fuel intensity and CO2 intensity of GDP. This relation is statistically significant when service sector size is measured using employment. It is not significant (at the 1% level) when service sector size is measured using value added. Since there is no evidence for a negative scaling exponent, the between-country data does not support relative dematerialization through services. However, the within-country evidence seems to contradict this finding (Fig. 5 and Tbl. 6) . Here, the average scaling relation is negative, but with weak statistical significance. The within-country data supports relative dematerialization through services, but contradicts the between-country evidence. I discuss the reason for this apparent contradiction in Section 5.
To summarize, the evidence indicates that a service transition does not lead to absolute carbon dematerialization. Thus, we must conclude that a service transition does not lead to greater sustainability. The evidence for relative carbon dematerialization is less clear. While unimportant for sustainability, relative dematerialization is a popular concept among environmental economists. Thus, it is important to understand the cause of the contradictory evidence.
Discussion
Our test of dematerialization through services yielded two notable findings. First, the evidence for relative dematerialization was conflicting. Second, there was no evidence for absolute dematerialization through services. I discuss possible explanations for these findings below.
The Contradictory Evidence for Relative Carbon Dematerialization
Why does between-country evidence suggest that relative carbon dematerialization through services is a failure? Yet within-country evidence suggests that it is a success? The answer is that relative carbon dematerialization trends are likely non-linear. They have an inverted-U shape over the long term.
To understand this behavior, we begin with the following relation:
This equation states that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP (E F F /GDP) is driven by the energy intensity of GDP (E T /GDP) and the fossil fuel fraction of total energy use (E F F /E T ). We want to know the trends in the right-hand terms in Eq. 3. Figure 6A shows between-country trends in the energy intensity of GDP vs. service employment share. Figure 6B shows within-country trends for the same relation. A service transition is associated with a decrease in the energy intensity of GDP. This is often touted as evidence for relative dematerialization through services. However, we must account for the type of energy used. Figures 6C and  6D show that the fossil fuel energy fraction tends to increase with a service transition. This is evident both between countries (Fig. 6C ) and within countries (Fig. 6D) . Why does this positive relation exist? Likely because a service transition is a basic part of industrialization. And the latter involves transitioning to fossil fuels (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012; Smil, 2008) .
To summarize, the energy intensity of GDP tends to decrease with a service transition. In contrast, the fossil fuel energy fraction tends to increase. These opposing trends explain the between-country relative dematerialization evidence (Fig. 4) . Over the long term, the increasing fossil fuel fraction drowns out the decreasing energy intensity of GDP. Since between-country analysis is sensitive to long-term trends, we find that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP increases with a service transition. 
Figure 7: The Plateau of the Fossil Fuel Energy Fraction and the U-Shaped Fossil Fuel Intensity of GDP
This figure shows how the evolution of the fossil fuel energy fraction leads to an inverted U-shaped relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Panel A shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel energy fraction and service employment share. Boxplots show the distribution of scaling exponents (α) for log-log regressions (see Eqs. 1 and 2). The distribution of α is disaggregated by country's service sector size. Panel B shows US fossil fuel energy fraction vs. service sector employment share. Panel C shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service sector employment share. Boxplots show the distribution of scaling exponents (α) for log-log regressions. The distribution of α is disaggregated by country's service sector size. Panel D shows the fossil fuel intensity of US GDP relative to service sector employment share. Data for Panels A and C comes from the World Bank (Tbl. 2). For US data sources and methods, see the Appendix.
When we use within-country data (Fig. 5) , we measure short-term trends. This is because the World Bank data covers less than 30 years. Over this period, within-country data indicates that the fossil fuel intensity of GDP decreases with a service transition. This contradictory trend is caused by non-linear behavior in the fossil fuel energy fraction. When countries industrialize, they undergo an energy transition to fossil fuels. But this energy transition eventually reaches fixation -usually when 80% to 90% of energy comes from fossil fuels. As a result, the fossil fuel fraction has a non-linear relation with service sector size.
Figures 7A and 7B illustrate this behavior. Figure 7A shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel energy fraction and service employment share. Each boxplot represents the distribution of the scaling exponent (α) for a log-log regression (see Eq. 1 and 2). Results are disaggregated by service sector size. We see a clear downward trend as the service sector grows. In countries with a small service sector (less than 50% of employment), the fossil fuel fraction increases with a service transition. But in countries with a large service sector (greater than 50% of employment), the fossil fuel fraction remains roughly constant. This behavior is also evident in the US (Fig. 7B) . From 1800 to 1920, the fossil fuel fraction increased as the service sector grew. But after 1920, the fossil fuel fraction plateaued -corresponding to a service sector employment share of roughly 40%. This non-linearity causes an inverted U-shaped relation between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service sector size. When the service sector is small, the fossil fuel fraction grows rapidly. This trumps the secular decline in the energy intensity of GDP. The result is an increase in the fossil fuel intensity of GDP with a service transition. But when the fossil fuel transition is complete, the declining energy intensity of GDP dominates the trend. This causes the fossil fuel intensity of GDP to decrease with further service growth. Figure 7C and 7D illustrate this inverted U-shaped behavior. Figure 7C shows within-country trends between the fossil fuel intensity of GDP and service employment share. Each boxplot represents the distribution of the scaling exponent (α) for a log-log regression (see Eq. 1 and 2). Results are disaggregated by service sector size. The relation is positive when the service sector is small. This means a service transition leads to greater fossil fuel intensity of GDP. But the relation becomes negative when the service sector is large. This means a continued service transition leads to lesser fossil fuel intensity of GDP If we had access to long-term trends for each individual country, they would likely look like those of the United States (Fig. 7B) . From 1800 to 1920, the fossil fuel intensity of US GDP increased as the service sector grew. But after 1920, the fossil fuel intensity of US GDP decreased as the service sector grew. The change in behavior corresponds to the plateau of fossil fuel use (Fig. 7B) .
Importantly, the downward part of the U does not fully reverse the upward part. This means that the long-term US trend is positive, even though the recent trend is negative. This explains our conflicting results in Figures 4 and 5 . The between-country analysis captures snapshots of countries along the long-term upward trend. The within-country analysis captures recent trends. Evidently most countries are now in the downward part of the U. However, this decrease in the fossil fuel intensity of GDP has not undone the large increases of the past.
Judging the Success of Relative Carbon Dematerialization
The U shape in the fossil fuel intensity of GDP complicates the judgment of relative dematerialization through services. Our verdict depends on our choice of time scale. Is a services transition a long-term phenomena? If so, then relative carbon dematerialization through services is a failure. Or is a service transition a recent phenomena? If so, relative carbon dematerialization has some success.
Trends in the United States suggest that a service transition is a long-term process. (Fig. 8A) . The employment share of the US service sector has grown continuously for over 200 years (other than a dip during the Civil War). What stands out in recent US history is not the growth of services, but the decline in industrial employment from 1970 onward. This is what many environmental economists think of as the 'service transition' -the replacement of industrial activity with service activity. The problem is that this deindustrialization trend is likely an artifact of global trade. The US is now a massive net importer of goods (Gierlinger and Krausmann, 2012) . This means that industrial employment is far smaller than it would be if all goods production happened domestically.
The only way to be sure that trade effects are not involved is to look at the world economy -the only closed economy on Earth. On the world scale, there is no hint of deindustrialization (Fig. 8B) . Instead, the trends mirror the longterm behavior in the US. Agriculture employment is declining, service sector employment is increasing, and industrial employment is roughly constant. This suggests that a service transition is a long-term process in which service employment replaces agricultural employment.
Thus, to evaluate the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis, we must give the most weight to long-term trends. On this front, the evidence is clear. Over the long term, a service transition does not lead to relative carbon dematerialization. And even if we are interested in short-term trends, we still have a problem. Relative carbon dematerialization has nothing to do with sustainability. Instead, it indicates how societies value economic activity in relation to carbon emissions. This valuation is an interesting sociological process that is worth studying. But it does not measure biophysical sustainability.
The Failure of Absolute Carbon Dematerialization
The failure of absolute carbon dematerialization through services is due to two factors. First, the fossil fuel energy fraction increases with service sector size (Figs. 6A and 6B ). Second, energy use per capita tends to increase with a service transition (Fig. 9 ). Given these two trends, it is unsurprising that absolute dematerialization through services fails.
What is surprising is the pervasiveness of the energy-services relation. A link between energy use and service employment is evident at many levels of analysis. It is evident for the world as a whole (Fig. 9A) . This is important, because the world is a closed system, so we can be sure that trade effects are not at play (i.e. offshoring pollution-intensive industry). A trend between energy use and service sector employment is evident between countries (Fig. 9B ) and within countries (Fig. 9C) . It is also evident over two centuries of US history (Fig. 9D ).
An energy-service trend is also evident within US industry. Figure 9E plots energy use per worker in US industry against the employment share of nonproduction workers in industry. Non-production workers are employed by goodsproducing firms, but not directly involved with production (BLS, 1957) . These workers do service-type activity within industry. Evidently this service-type activity tends to grow as industrial energy use increases.
To summarize, an energy-services relation is evident at the global, international, national, and sectoral level. Moreover, this energy comes mostly from fossil fuels. As a result, a service transition is associated with greater carbon emissions.
Why is a Service Transition Associated With Greater Energy Use?
The increase of energy use with a service transition seems counter-intuitive. Compared to industry, the service sector uses far less direct energy per worker (Fig. 1 ). Yet the growth of service employment is strongly associated with the growth of energy use per capita. How can this be?
Jesper Jespersen points out a flaw in the 'dematerialization through services' reasoning. It assumes that a society can replace industrial activity with service activity, while leaving the structure of both sectors unchanged. But this is not what happens. Jespersen elaborates:
A significant and perhaps fundamental weakness of [the 'dematerialization through services' proposal] is that in the real economy (especially within the private sector) agriculture, manufacturing and services cannot be treated separately. Goods cannot be produced, sold and consumed without involving services related to business, finance, transport, the wholesale and retail trade, communication, waste processing and so on. In many respects these activities are complements rather than substitutes. The point is that it is not possible just to switch between the manufacturing and service sectors because the indirect impact of changes in the altered manufacturing sector on the service sector is quite considerable. (Jespersen, 1999) In reality, a service transition is associated with a host of complex social changes. Most importantly, the growth of services is related to economic growth. This is an old idea, not a new discovery. More than 70 years ago Colin Clark argued that "the most important concomitant of economic progress" was "the movement of working population from agriculture to manufacture, and from manufacture to commerce and services" (Clark, 1940) . Proponents of 'dematerialization through services' have forgotten this idea. If a service transition is a key part of economic growth, it is easy to see why it fails to reduce emissions. Economic growth is overwhelmingly associated with increases in energy use (Brown et al, 2011 (Brown et al, , 2014 .
To understand the link between economic growth, energy, and sectoral change, it is helpful to focus on labor productivity. Economists are nearly unanimous that economic growth involves increasing worker productivity. But what is often undiscussed is that increasing productivity generally requires greater energy use. Why? Productivity growth is typically achieved by augmenting human labor with machines. And these machines require energy to function. The laws of thermodynamics forbid otherwise. Thus mechanization requires ramping up the energy used by machines. Not suprisingly, there is a strong relation between labor productivity and energy use (Cleveland et al, 1984; Hall et al, 1986; Fix, 2015) .
But how does the growth of productivity relate to a service transition? One possibility is that the service sector grows to consume the surplus produced in other sectors. Giampietro et al. credit George Zipf (1941) for first emphasizing consumption capacity:
Zipf proposed a basic principle of socio-economic development: if an economy wants to be able to produce more, it has to invest more in consuming. This principle implies that socio-economic development must be based on achieving an internal balance between parallel investments both of human activity and of energy over the two compartments of production and consumption ... Another possibility is that the service sector provides facilitation activity to other sectors (North, 1990) . Many services (such as accounting, logistics, education, etc.) are essential to goods production. It seems plausible that the demand for these services grows with energy use. Indeed, the evidence in Figure 9D hints that this is the case. As energy use per worker in US industry increases, so does the share of service-type activity (measured as the employment share of non-production workers).
Why is there a link between energy use and facilitation activity? A plausible reason is that increasing energy use requires more complex technology (Fix, 2017) . As an example, consider the difference between subsistence and industrial agriculture. Subsistence farmers produce most of their own tools. Industrial farmers do not. Think of the large machines used by industrial farmers. Now pic- ture the services needed to produce and maintain these machines. This includes the engineers who design the machines, the administrators who coordinate production, the educators who train the skilled workforce, and so on. It may be a general rule that facilitation activity tends to grow as technology becomes more complex. This is consistent with the tendency for social complexity to increase with economic development (Carneiro, 1967; Naroll, 1956; Zipf, 1949) .
I have focused on the movement of employment between sectors because it makes the flaws in the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis easiest to spot. But what if a country increases the service sector's share of value added without shifting employment? While this may be possible in principle, the evidence suggests it is hard to do in practice. National variation in service sector employment share accounts for about 37% of the variation in service sector value-added share (Fig. 10A) . Within countries, a 1% increase in service employment share leads to an average increase of 0.75% in service value-added share (Fig. 10B) . This is not hard to understand. Most services are labor intensive (think health care and education) and increasing labor productivity is difficult (Baumol, 1967) .
Conclusions
In 1972, the Club of Rome released its famous report The Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972) . Since then, economists have debated whether economic growth can decouple from environmental impact. Proponents of the 'environmental Kuznets curve' argue that decoupling is possible (Grossman and Krueger, 1994; Panayotou, 1993; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992) . The idea is that environmental impact first rises and then falls with economic growth. The transition to services provides a plausible mechanism for this decoupling. Panayotou et al (2000) propose that "economic growth brings about structural change that shifts the center of gravity of the economy from low-polluting agriculture to high-polluting industry and eventually back to low polluting services".
The problem with this hypothesis is that it neglects the complex social changes that come with a service transition. As Colin Clark (1940) observed long ago, sectoral change seems to be a key part of economic growth. And economic growth is strongly associated with the growth of fossil fuel energy use (Brown et al, 2011 (Brown et al, , 2014 . When framed this way, it is not surprising that the 'dematerialization through services' hypothesis fails. I find no evidence that a service transition reduces carbon emissions. Instead, it is associated with the growth of per capita emissions.
What are the implications for policy makers? It seems that a service transition does not 'automatically' lead to decreased environmental impact. This implies that purposeful policy intervention is required. It is obviously important to decarbonize energy sources by investing in renewable energy. But it is unclear how this relates to sectoral change (if it relates at all). Future research may make this clearer. But for now, we can draw a simple conclusion. The evidence indicates that 'dematerialization through services' is not a valid policy for reducing carbon emissions. Tables 6.8A -D (persons engaged in production). I calculate employment of non-production workers in industry is using Bureau of Labor Statistics series CES0600000006 (Production and non-supervisory employees, goods-producing) and series CES0600000001 (All employees, goodsproducing). I define non-production workers as the difference between total employment and production employment.
